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In the

SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

)
)

DARNELL L. CARCIA,

Defendant-Respondent.

)

Case No.

12994

)

BRIEF OF-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by the State of Utah
from an order arresting judgment in a criminal prose-

cution and discharging the defendant-respondent.
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DISPOSITION IN UJWER COURT
The Respondent, Darnell L. Garcia, was tried for
burglary in the second degree on May 18, 1972, by the
Honorable Calvin Gould in the District Court of the
Second Judicial District, Weber County, Utah.

Judg-

ment was arrested against the Respondent before final
judgment was pronounced, and the Respondent was discharged because of a denial of equal protection of
the laws as guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order dismissing this appeal
as being moot; or alternatively, an advisory opinion affirming the lower Court's order arresting
judgment and discharging Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Some of the facts as presented by Appellant

ar' totally incorrect and grossly misleading.
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Respondent strongly objects to Appellant's
assertion that judgment was entered against the
Respondent in this matter (App. Br. at 2, 1)).

No

final judgment was ever entered; judgment was arrestee
and Respondent was discharged (R.

95).

Respondent also strongly objects to Appellant's
statement that different evidence concerning each
of the defendants was introduced at the prelillinary
hearing (App. Br. at
was ever held.

3).

No preliminary hearing

At the time set for such hearing

the charge against the co-defendant, Houle, was reduced (R.

6), and Respondent waived the preliainary

examination (R. 6).

In fact, it wou:H appear that

any evidence which might have been introduced at the
preliminary hearing would be the same for both defendants r

the witnesses were all subpoened to

testify against both Houle and Respondent, and both
hearings were set for the same time and the saae
place.

4
Respondent also strongly objects to Appellant's
assertion that there was a strong difference in
previous criminal records (App. Br. at

J).

No evi-

dence whatsoever was introduced as to the record of
the co-defendant, Houle, and only one previous misdemeanor plea appears in the record with respect to
Respondent (R. 94).

Respondent also strongly objects

to Appellant's assertion that Respondent had previously been convicted of a felony.

Even though

the record at first seemed so to indicate, upon further
inquiry it was found that Respondent had pleaded
guilty to a misdemeanor and had served a probationary period without incident (R. 94).
In the lower Court, two defendants were charged
with the same offense--burglary.

One was Randall

Robert Houle, and the other Darnell L. Garcia, the
Respondent herein.

Houle was held on $2,500.00 bail

and Respondent on $1,000.00 bail (R.

5).

They were

jointly involved in a single, identical public offense.
After all of the evidence was received and the
lower Court had entered a finding of guilt, defense
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counsel moved for a reduction of charges alleging
a denial of equal protection of the laws because
Respondent's co-defendant was allowed to plead to
a misdemeanor and Respondent was compelled to stand
trial for a felony

(R.86). The co-defendant had

been sentenced to serve ten days in the Weber County
jail and was given credit for ten days already
served (R.6).
The Court requested the prosecution to eny
lighten it as to the justifications for treating
the two defendants unequally in violation of the
Alllerican Bar Association standards (R.88).

A day

and time were stipulated for taking evidence on the

State's justifications, but at the hearing, the
prosecution produced nothing (R.89-90).

The Lower

Court arrested judgment against the Respondent pursuant to Utah Code Ann. ?7-35-10, and discharged
Respondent (Ro95).
Respondent Garcia is twenty years of age

(R.78).

6
ARGUMENT

POINT I
APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS MISCONVEIVED1
THERE IS NO JUIX;MENT OF THE LOWER COURT WHICH
CAN BE REINSTATED, AND REVERSAL WOULD BE FUTILE.
Appellant seeks an order from this Court
"reinstating the Lower Court's judgment on May 18,

1972" (App. Br. at

J).

This request is repeated at

page 13 of Appellant's brief.

Such a request for

relief indicates how inaccurate ct!td misleading the

brief of Appellant is.

At no time did the Lower

Court enter any•judgment which could be reinstated.
At the hearing on the motion to reduce charges

or arrest judgment, the Lower Court statedt
"Well, I still have before me the question
of whether or not jucigment should be imposed • • • So it appears to me that my
responsibility is to either impose judgment or discharge him • • • And I therefore arrest juds;ment pursuant to 77-35-10
and order the Defendant discharged because of the violation of the u. s.
Constitution." (R. 94-95) (Emphasis added)
On May 18, 1972, a finding of guilt was made,
but judgment was reserved for a later date, and was

7
never entered.

Therefore, there is no judgment

which can possibly be reinstated by this Court.
In State v. Fedder, 1 Utah 2d. 117, 262 P.2d

753 (1953), a convicted felon had been placed on
probation.

After he violated his probation, the

State sought to have a sentence imposed.

The

defendant appealed alleging that sentencing or
final judgment must be ma.de within a reasonable
period of time, and that that period of time had
expired.

This Court made very clear the fact that

a finding of guilt in a criminal action is not a
final judgment, but a judgment is sentencing or
others
"action of a Court of criminal jurisdiction
formally declaring to the accused the
legal consequences of the guilt which he
has confessed or of which he has been
convicted." Id. at 120. (Emphasis
added)
In the present case, no action was ever taken declaring to the accused the legal consequences of

8
his guilt.

No appealable, reinstatable judgment

was ever pronounced by the lower Court.
That there was no reinstatable judgment of the
lower Court is also made explicitly clear by the
definition of the term "arrest of judgment" found
in Section 77-)4-1 of Utah Code Annotated1
"A motion in arrest of judgment is an
application • • • that no judgment be
rendered • • • " (Emphasis added)

Not only is there no judgment which can be
reinstated, but the case itself could not be reinstated, nor the lower Court properly ordered to
impose judgment, even i f the Appellant had requested
such relief.
In State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 15? P.2d

258 (1945), the defendant had been prosecuted on a
charge of involuntary manslaughter.

When the State

rested, defendant's motion for dismissal was granted

and the defendant discharged.

The State appealed.

This Court clearly and correctly stated that the
case could not be reinstateda
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"This being an appeal by the State 1n a
criminal case, the case is reversed but
the trial Court is directed to proceed
no further.w Id. at ?J. (Emphasis added)
In that same case, Chief Justice Larson, in
his dissenting opinion, spelled out the rule on the
point in question with more particularity, as
follows&
"AplX'als by the State in criminal cases
lie only on questions of law, since defendant cannot be again brought to trial.
An appeal therefore that does not settle
a ~oint of law which will be helpful in
future cases is wholly abortive, a waste
of time, effort and exoense , , , Since
the effect of the judgment, and the position and rights of the parties are the ·
same, regardless of reversal, and no law
question is settled for future cases,
the whole thing is in the nature of a
sideshow--a moot entertainment without
effecto 11 M• at 92-9. (Emphasis added)
In State v, Gustaldi, 41 Utah 63, 123 Pac.

89? (1912), a defendant was charged with murder in
the first degree.

After the State's first witness

was called and the first question asked, the def endant objected to any evidence on the ground

that there had been no preliminary exanination as
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required by law.

The Court sustained the objection

and on its own motion, discharged the defendant
from custody.

The State appealed, and this Court

held in part 1
"We are asked by the district attorney to
make an order requiring the District
Court to reinstate this case, and to proceed to try the defendant upon the information filed against him. We cannot do
~ upon this record.
Moreover, in this
proceeding we are not authorized to pass
upon the legal effect of the order and
judgment of the District Court by which
the action was dismissed and the jury and
defendant discharged... Id. at 72.
(Emphasis added)
Even in cases in which the lower Court

is

found to have erred--something which the lower Court
in this case clearly did not do--this Court has
stated it cannot reinstate the matter.

In State v.

Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114 P.2d 1034 (1941), one
Dewey Johnson was convicted of injuring a cow.

Froa

an order granting defendant's motion 1n arrest of
judgment and discharging defendant, the State of

Utah appealed. Even though the defendant

had

been

convicted and error had occurred, the Supreme Court
could not reinstatea

11

"The Court was in error in arresting judgment and discharging the defendanto Since
the defendant has been discharged by the
Court he cannot again be tried for this
offense and all this Court can do in such
case is settle the law involved." Id. at
JJ5 (Eaphasis added)
The statutes concerning arrest of jUdgment

irrefutably indicate its effect as a bars
"The effect of allowing a motion in
arrest of judgment shall be to place
the defendant in the same situation in
which he was before the information
was filed or the indictment found."
Utah Code Ann. 77-34-3
• • and the arrest of jud.gment shall
operate as an acquittal of the charge
unon which the information or indictment is founded." Utah Code Ann.
77-34-4. (Emphasis added)

H•

The principles which are clearly stated in
,.

State v. Thatcher, supra, State v. Gustaldi, supra,

and State v. Johnson, supra, and in the statutes
on arrest of judgment are certainly correct.

Vhere

jeopardy has attached in a case and the defendant
ls subsequently discharged before judgment has

entered, such discharge is a complete bar to further
proceedings in that matter.
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Jeopardy attache as soon as the State's first
witness is sworn and testifies against the defendant.

In State v. Gustaldi, supra, the first

witness had answered the first question put bJ the
State, and the Supreme Court held that the case
could not be reinstated.

In State v. Johnson,

supra, the defendant had been convicted as in the
present case, but judgment arrested before final
judgment had entered.

The Supreme Court could not

reinstate the case.
A more recent case in Colorado takes the saae
position as this Court.

In Markiewicz, et. al.,

v, Black, eto al., 334 P.2d 539 (Colo. 19.58), defendanis had entered a plea of guilty.

A time was

set at which evidence was received for purposes ot
sentencing.

Upon hearing the evidence, defendants

were discharged because the evidence did not sustain the plea.

Later, attempts were made to charge

the defendants with the identical offense and tbe
defendants sought a writ of prohibition against
further proceedings.

The Court helda·
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"A plea of guilty to an 1nd1ctaent, 1n
good faith, with its entry on the record,
is jeopardy, although judgment was suspended or the prosecution was dismissed
without the consent of the accused •• •"
Id. at 541 (Emphasis added)
The Court further stated1
"At this hearing the Respondent heard the
evidence presented, found that the evidence did not sustain the pleaa, and
ordered the case dismissed and the-j?etitioners discharged. We need not pass on
the pronriety of this order--right or
wro
-petitioners were in ·eo ard •"
Id.
5 1-.542. Emphasis added
In the present case there was not just a plea
of guilt which placed Respondent in jeopardy, but
a finding of guilt after evidence had been taken.
Certainly jeopardy attached, and any order of this
Court attempting to reinstate the case--even it
Appellant had sought to have the case reinstated-would only result in a plea of former jeopardy.
Thus, action by this Court would be futile.

The only final, appeala.ble order in this case
1s the action of the lower Court arresting judgment
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and discharging the defendant.

However, an1

question as to this order is moot, because the
defendant cannot again be placed in jeopardy after
his acquittal.

Only an advisory opinion could be

written by this Honorable Court to clarify the
law.

See State v. Thatcher, supra.
The following points of argument are included

in Respondent's brief so that if this Court feels
disposed to rule on the correctness of the lower
Court's order to arrest judgment, and to write an
advisory opinicm settling the law in question, this
Court will affirm the lower Court and clarify to

all prosecutors the need for equal treatment ot all
peoples before the law.

POINT II.
RESPONDENT AND HIS CO-DEFENDANT WERE IDENTI•
CALLY SITUATED WITH RESPECT TO THE CRIME
CHARGED AND NO JUSTIFTING REASON APPEARED
FOR DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT.
The Respondent and his co-defendant were not

lerely similarly, but identically, situated with
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respect to the alleged crime.

Appellant argues that

one of the reasons why the charge was reduced as to
one co-defendant and not as to the other was a ditf erence in evidence.

The record, however, shows

almost an identity of evidence which could have been
presented at the trials of the two defendants.

The

following discussion of facts and testimony clearly
shows that both defendants were present at the scene
of the crime, that both defendants took an active
part in the perpetration of the crime, that both
defendants were arrested within a minute or two of :each other, that both were apprehended within a few
feet of the window which was broken to gain entry,
that both defendants made admissions and incriminating
statements to the police and that both defendants
were charged with the same crime.
The witness, Mrs. Hardy, heard and saw two men
talking directly below the window which was later
broken, and she saw two men ducking to avoid car

lights (R. J2-JJ, )8, 41, 79).

The broken window

was apparently so high that boosting from the outside
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or pulling from within would be necessary to enter
(R. 79, 40, 84).

Whether one or both of the co-

defendants entered the building is, of course,
irrelevant, but some testimony does indicate that
two aen may have been inside.

The witness, Mrs.

Hardy, saw one man jump from the window either before the police came or just after the police cars
arrived (R. 34), and another man apparently jumped
after the police cars had arrived and the policemen
had walked around, had conferred with each other and
had separated (R. 40, 34, 46-47).

Defendant Houle

was first seen by the police ten feet from the
building walking away from the area of the broken
window and appearing very nervous (R. 60).
immediately apprehended (R. 60).

He was

Mr. Garcia was

caught a few feet from the building, running from
the area of the broken window (Ro 47).

Mr. Houle

admitted knowledge of the burglary by indicating,
among other things, that someone else was still in
the building (R. 61, 62).

I

Mr. Garcia admitted to

17
having "screwed up" and to having scraped his shin
on the window (R. 67, 68).
The only difference in evidence would be that
Mr. Garcia aay have scraped his shin and cut his
trousers going through the window (R, 69, 67), but
such testimony would only establish the fact that
at least one of the two individuals had entered
the building--a fact necessary for the ecnviction
of either of them.
Not only does the trial record reveal no diff erence in the evidence which might differentiate

between the defendants, but the prosecuting attorne1
could find none.

The prosecuting attorney was

specifically requested by the lower Court to enlighten
it as to any possible justifications for such disparate treatment, and the county attorney indicated
he would have sufficient time to prepare far the
hearing (R. 88}. And yet, after utilizing that
sufficient ti.me and after conferring with people in

I his
!

;,

office (R, 89), he came up with nothing.

He
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could not enlighten the Court as to any related
rational distinctions in evidence to justify one
defendant's being allowed to plead guilty to reduced charges.
Also, Appellant misleadingly asserts that dif •
ferent evidence was presented at the preliminary
hearing against the defendants {App. Br. at

3).

However, no preliminary hearings were held as has
been explained in the FACTS, supra.

Appellant's second justification for discrilllinatory treatment against Respondent Garcia is a ditf erence in the previous criminal records between
the two defendants {App. Br. at
misleading and incorrect.

J).

This, too, is

No evidence whatsoever

appears in the trial record as to the past criminal
record of the co-d.efendant, Houle, and very little
appears as to that of the Respondent.

Respondent

Carcia admitted pleading guilty to a misdemeanor
for which he served out a probationary period without event (R. 94).

The trial record seems to
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indicate at one point that Respondent was convicted
of a previous felony (R. 82), but the record later
shows that that is incorrect (R. 94).

EYen though

Respondent had pleaded guilty to a previous misdemeanor, no evidence was 'Presented at the hearing
on the motion to reduce charges to show that defendant Houle's record was any less than that of
Bespondent.

Again, it must be pointed out that

the county attorney hiJlself indicated he had suff 1cient time to prepare for the hearing and to point
out to the Court at least one justification for unequal treatment, yet nothing was produced to show
the previous criminal record of either defendant.
Respondent challenges the record and challenges
Appellant to show from the record any difference
whatsoever in prior criminal records between Respondent
and his co-defendant.

Even if the prosecution had shown the lower
Court that a difference in prior criminal records
existed between the two defendants, such a showing
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would not justify unequal treatment before trial.
Prior records do not determine guilt or innocence
or chances for conviction or involvment in a crime
or any other factor which a prosecutor might consider in reducing charges.

Prior records are a

tool of judges to properly determine a just sentence,
a sentence to fit an individual who has already been
found guilty.
Not only is there no evidentiary difference
or any difference in the prior records between the
two defendants, but no other justifying reason was
given why one defendant should be allowed to serve
ten days and the other be tried for a felony carrying
a sentence of from one to twenty years in the state
prison.

The county attorney himself indicated that

off-hand, he felt that the two individuals should
have been treated equally (R.

87), and in trying

to understand the discriminatory treatment, even inquir1d if the other defendant had testified on be-

half of the State, which he had not (R. 87).
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The lower Court did not err.

On the contrar7,

it gave the prosecution eYery opportunity to justify
its d1scria1natory treatment, but was coapelled to
arrest jlJd8ment and discharge the defendant because
the prosecution produced absolutely nothing to
justify its actions.
POINT III.
SUBJECTING ONE OF TWO CO-DEFENDANTS TO THB
POSSIBILITY OF FAR GREATER PUNISHMENT FOR
DOING THE SAME ACT UNDER THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES IS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAW UNLESS SOME JUSTIFYING REASON APPEARS.
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington
considered a similar issue in State v. Zornes, 4?5
P.2d 109 (Wash. 1970) (hereinafter cited as Zornes).
In that case, a statute effectively gave the prosecution the authority to charge one of two individuals
doing the same act under the same circUDlstances with
a felony and the other with a misdemeanor.

The statute

laid down no basis or standard to distinguish between
the felony and the aisdemeanor caseso

The Washington

Court reversed the lower Court's conviction and disllissed the aatter, paraphrasing a previous Washington ·
case as controllinga
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"An act (legislative) which prescribes
different punishJlents for the same act
and thereby purports to authorize a
prosecutor to charge one person with a
felony and a.~other with a misdemeanor
for the same act col!l1llitted under the
same circumstances, denies the equal
protection of the law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution ••• Id. at 117. (Emphasis
added)

-

Although Zornes concerns a state statute, the
principle applies equally well if not more to prosecutors not acting under color of a statute.

In

Zornes, the statute allowed the prosecution to subject
one of two similarly situated defendants to the
possibility of greater punishment, but presented

the prosecution no reasonable or justifiable standard
to aid in determining who should or should not be ·
subjected to the possibility of the greater punish-

ment.

In the present case, the prosecution, without

the benefit of a statute, subjects one of the two
defendants to the possibility of imllensely greater
punishment and treats one lightly "for the same act
com.m1tted under the same circumstances" without any

reasonable or justifiable basis whatsoever.

And the

23
co-defendants in the present case were not merel7
similarly but identically situated.
Certainly, a prosecutor must not be allowed to
do by indirection what is forbidden an entire state
legislature to do directly.

The result is the saae

whether reached by a prosecutor or by a legislature,
and that result is a denial of equal protection of the

law guaranteed by the United States Constitution and
similarly the constitution of the State of Utah.
In Zornes, the Court carefully distinguished
situations where discretion, based upon soae relevant
and justifiable basis, results in the possibility of

greater punishment.

For exalllple, a jllige's discretion

in sentencing was correctly d1stinguished1 a judge
must certainly weigh and consider and base every sent-

ence upon many relevant factors.

Also, a law which

made one of two similar offenses a felony and the other

a misdemeanor (use and possession of drugs) was dis•
tinguished as not being a denial of equal protection
' because "the elements of the two crimes differed and
there was a legislative standard for the prosecution to ·
decide which offender should be charged under which
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statute."

Id. at 118.

But where, as in the present case, the proseeution 's discretion has been unbridled, and where
no logical consideration or reason whatsoever is
presented to an inquiring Court to justify a difference in treatment of the two identically situated
individuals, subjecting one of the two individuals
to the possibility of far greater punishment than
the other is a denial of equal protection of the
laws.
In In Re King, 474 P.2d 983 (Cal. 1970), the California Supreme Court struck down a state criminal
statute which would have achieved the same result aa
was attempted to be achieved against Respondent in

the present case.

The statute provided that resi-

dent, non-supporting fathers were chargeable with a
misdemeanor while out-of-state non-supporting fathers
were chargeable with a felony.

The Court recognized

that to expose one of two individuals to the possib111 ty of a more seveiepunishment, some differentiating
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rational basis, related to the crime, is mandatory.
The Court paraphrased the petitioner's argument

and

concurred therewith1
"He (Petitioner) argues that in punishing a
father who 'remains out of the state• aore
severely than the father remaining within
the state, the provision establishes a
classification not sufficiently related to
any legitimate governmental purpose and
effectively undertakes an impermissible
invidious discrimination against nonCalifornia residents." Id. at 987.
The Co\lI't concludes that "the felony provision

• • • must succumb to the Constitutional attack
mounted by petitioner,"

Id. at 987.

The Court further coJJ1J11ented on the need for a
related basis for discriminatory treatments
..The nature of the crime of non-support does
not vary with the place of its coJlllllission."
~· at 988.
In other words, imposing more severe charges and
greater punishment merely because of an unrelated factor
suck as locality of the offense is unconstitutional.
Similarly, imposing greater charges on Respondent
is unconstitutional, for no factor which changed the

"nature of the crime" nor was even remotely related
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to the crime was presented to the lover Court 1a
justification of the discriminatory action on the
part of the prosecution.
Here, it must be reiterated that a prosecutor
must not be allowed to do by indirection what is forbidden an entire state legislature to do directly.

Not only does logic dictate that the principle
enunciated in Zornes and In Re Kif16 applies equally
well to prosecutors as it does to legislatures, but
the United States Supreme Court has indicated that
same position.

In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,

7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (hereinafter cited as

Oyler)~

Appellant was convicted under the West Virginia
habitual criminal statute and filed a Habeas Corpus
application in the Supreme Court of West Virginia
alleging, among other grounds, a denial of equal protection because the habitual criminal statute had
been applied only to a minority of those persons sub-

ject to its provisions.

The Court was unanimous in

finding no denial of equal protection as a result of
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the alleged discriminatory application of the statute,
because a rational basis appeared for the seemingl7
discriminatory treataent1
"Hence, the allegations set out no more
than a failure to prosecute others because
of a lack of knowle e of their
ior
offenses." Id. at 45 • Emphasis added)
In the present ease, however, the county attorney's
office did not fail to prosecute Respondent's coconspirator on the felony charge as a result of lack
of knowledge, lack of evidence or lack or presence of any
other factor which related to the crime.

The evi-

dence was identical as to both defendants.
In Oyler, the Court further explained its finding
that there was no denial of equal protection because
some rational basis for seeaing discrillination
appeared a
"It was not stated that the selection of
those to be prosecuted was deliberately
based upon an unjustifiable standard such
as race rel' ion or other arbitrar
classification." Id. at 45 • Emphasis
added)
~
In the present case, however, judgment was arrested
precisely for the reason that the selection of the
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person to be prosecuted for the felon7 was stated

by Respondent's counsel to be based on nothing but

an unjustifiable arbitrary standard or classification.

Respondent's attorney brought the discrimina-

tion to the attention of the Court

(R. 86-87),

and

as has been previously stated, the prosecution failed

to produce even an iota of evidence upon which to
base a justifiable reason or standard for its actions.

Appellant again misleads this Court by quoting
Miss

Rita James, Court appointed amicus curiae, as

distinguishing Oyler from the present case (App. ·

Br. at

9).

context.

Appellant takes her statements out of

In reality, she cited Oyler for the pro-

position that there had been a denial of equal protection in the present case, if no justifying reason
for differing treatment existed.

She clearly stated1

"But to read Oyler without getting that
meaning out of it wouldn't make any sense
really." (R. 92)
After independent research by Miss James to aid
I

I

I

I

the lower Court in determining the law on reducing
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charges against one of two similarly situated defendants, she concluded1
"If the Court finds as a matter of fact that
the defendant was a victim of some arbitrary
discrimination, 1.e., that the decision to
allow his co-defendant to plead guilty to a
misdemeanor was not based on some matter
relating to the evidence or other area in
the nrosecutor's discretion, that we have
an uneJual apnlication of the laws."
(R. 91
(Emphasis added}.
Not only have the Courts reccgnized that in the
interests of justice and fairness silllilarly situated
defendants must be treated similarly, but the .American
Bar Association (hereinafter referred to as the ABA)
has so recognized.

The ABA minimWR standards relating

to pleas of guilty, which all prosecutors in good
conscience should follow, clearly statess
"Similarly situated defendants should be
afforded equal plea agreement opportunities." ABA, Standards Relating to
Pleas of Guilty{ J.l(c) at page 11 (1968)
(Emphasis added}
This standard is one of many adopted by the
House of Delegates of the ABA on February 19, 1968,
after years of study, evaluation and consideration.

Appellant cites NeWJnan v. United

States~

)82

F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (hereinafter cited as
Nenan) as the leading case for the proposition that

different treatment of identically situated defendants is not a denial of equal protection of the
laws.

However, Newman is based on a proposition

which is entirely inapplicable to the present ease,
i.e., that Courts cannot review the acts of prosecutors1
"The Courts have no power over the exercise of his (a prosecutor's) discretion
or his motives as they relate to the
execution of his duty." Id. at 481.
(Emphasis added)
In Newman, the Court found no denial of equal
protection, because the Court failed to look at the
merits of the acts of the prosecutors.

The Court

assumed that it could not inquire into those acts.
Later, the Court reiterated. its statement1
"No Court has any jurisdiction to inquire
into or review his (a prosecutor's)
decision ... Id. at 482.
The Court's position is that a prosecutor is
responsible to the judiciary

onl~

"for the manner of

his conduct of a case, i.e., his demeanor, deportment

L

and

____;,I,;;d~·_:a'.:_t:_48.:..::.:l~·'...-----------

ethical conduct,,_"_-

Jl
In Newman, the Court felt that assistant United
States attorneys should be responsible to higher-ups
in the justice department and not to the Courts.

But the principle announced in Newman is
totally inapplicable in the present case.

The most

basic principles of judicial review and administrative law allow Courts to consider executive decisions.
Certainly, a prosecutor's discretion does not extend
to arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or unconstitutional acts: and surely the Courts can review
alleged constitutional violations resulting from ·
abuse of discretion.
In Oyler, supra, the Supreme Court of the United
States reviewed the acts of the prosecution and
apparently did so because it is not only the right ..
but the duty of the Courts to review administrative
acts which aay have resulted in constitutional violations.
The idea that a :prosecutor should be responsible
to higher-ups also does not apply in the present

case.

The county attorney has no higher-ups to

account to.

And even if there were higher-ups, it

is the duty of the Courts to advise and settle the

law so that the superiors can attempt to bring their

people in line therewith.
United States v. Taylor, 448 F.2d 1280 (4th
Cir. 1971) as cited by Appellant was decided on the
same inapplicable principle.·
Appellant also cites State v. Andrews, 165
N,W,2d 528 (Minn. 1969) (hereinafter cited as
Andrews) as controlling.

However, 1n that case

the record contained nothing about the prosecution's
considerations or lack of considerations in treating
defendants differentlys
"The record is obscure if not silent as
to what considerations impelled the
prosecution to grant lieniency to
Schwarting (one of the defendants).M
M_. at 5JO.
In the present case, however, the record is not
obscure as to the considerations of the prosecutor.

The prosecution was specifically requested to tell the

:n
lower Court what considerations were inTolved
(R. 88) and none could be presented.

The present

case is not an attempt to discover why the prosecution did what id did after the record is closed as
in Andrews, but it is a case in which the prosecutor's lack of considerations is a matter of record.
The record is neither silent nor obscure.
Also, in Andrews, the Court based its decision
on an assumption that does not -apply in the present
cases
"We can only assume that the prosecutor
may have been willing to reduce the charge
against Appellant if he in turn was willing
to plead guilty." Id. at 5Jl.

In the present case, however, the defendant was
indeed willing to plead to a lessor offense, and even
requested the opportunity so to plead

(R. 86-8?).

Ref erring again to Miss James, counsel for
Appellant make a very unfair and misleading statement on page 8 of their brief concerning her advice
to the lower Court.

A reading of the record will

disclose that her statement on page 8 of Appellant's

brief is cleverly and unfairly paraphrased and taken
out of context by Counsel for Appellant.

Although

Appellant cites her as making a positive assertion,
her real statement is in the nature of a passing
thought in which she used the word "perhaps" three
times, and which she even refuted as producing
ridiculous results1
"If we say that (that which Appellant paraphrased) we are in a position of a wrong
(to Respondent and others similarly situated)
without a remedy, and this is an untenable
position." (R. 93) (Emphasis added)
To show how erroneous the misstated position
is, which Miss James herself indicates as untenable;
Respondent cites the law on the aatterr
"That the mistake that occurred in these
proceedings was one of law and as to the
powers and duties of the magistrate, and
that the result thereof will result in
the -person charged going without sentence
or punishment whatsoever, does not alter
his rights or change his position.* * * "
Belter v. State, 178 Wis. 57, 189 N.W.
270 at 271 (1922). (Emphasis added)

The case of State v. Gamelgard, l?? N.V.2d

404 (Minn. 1970) is cited by Appellant but has nothing
to do with prosecutorial discretion and denial of

J5
equal protection.

The only denial of equal pro-

tection of the laws alleged in that case is far
unreasonable differences in sentencing.

Id. at 4'J?.

In State v. Verdugo, 79 N.M. 765, 449 P.2d
781 (1969) cited by Appellant, nothing appears which
might indicate that the evidence was identical against
both conspirators or that one did not cooperate and

testify on behalf of the State, or that no other
justification for differing treatment appeared.

The

facts are so lean and sparse that no one could sa7
that they approach the facts at bar.
Other cases cited by Appellant are also not
applicable to the case at bar.

The cases of

People v. Winters, 342 P.2d 538 (cal. App. 1959)r
Sanders v. Waters, 199 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1952)s
State v. Reichenberger, 182 N.W.2d 692 (Minn. 1970)r
State v. Hicks, 325 P.2d 794 (Ore. 1958)1 State v.
Anderson, 159 NW.2d 892 (Minn. 1968) all stand for
the proposition that a defendant is not denied equal
protection of the laws merely because other people

somewhere have not been prosecuted for the saae
offense.

These cases do not concern unequal treat-

ment of co-defendants charged with coaaitting an·
identical crime.

Appellant might better have cited

State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 2d 174, 406 P.2d 912

(1965).

In that case the prosecution stipulated that

the action against the defendant was the only prosecution under the statute within two years.

This

Court held that such a stipulation did not indicate
that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to bring
cases against those who might be similarly situated1
"We think the stipulation could by no means
bind this Court by negative inuendo that
because no one else was prosecuted, the
defendant was persecuted." Id. at 177.
But even State v. Starlight Club, is not in point
here.

In the present case, the evidence was suffi-

cient to arrest and charge both defendants and they
were so charged.

Also, the nature of that evidence

did not change nor did new evidence appear after the
arrest which might show that one of the two defendants
was innocent or could not be convicted.

The present

-case is not a matter of selectivel1 prosecuting those
individuals against whom evidence has been or can
be

obtaineda but it is a case of discriminatorilf

prosecuting where the evidence is identical.
It must also be ma.de clear that Respondent la
not attacking the plea bargaining process.

Reductions

in charges are often necessary and advisable in our
judicial system as it now operates, but reductions
should and must be based upon SOile logical considerations which are related to the offense.
Defendants who are similarly situated must be
similarly treated with respect to prosecution or

our American system has failed miserably to mete out
justice and gain the respect of all races and peoples.
The lower Court would have greatly erred had it al.lowed
Respondent to be prosecuted for the felony.

Assuaing

arguendo that Respondent had been convicted and he
had been sent to the state prison and a felony conviction had been placed on his record, and keeping in
mind that his co-defendant served ten days in a

county jail and that no differences existed between
the two defendants, what could anyone in this world
say to the parents and the relatives and the friends

of Respondent which could in any way convince the•
that justice applies to all equally and that Chicanos
are on equal terms with all races before the law?

The most unsophisticated sense of injustice would
awaken and be repelled at such a difference in treatment between two individuals.

The lower Court acted

to assure all peoples equal protection before the law
and did not err.
CONCLUSION
This appeal is moot and should be dismissed.
No

judgment exists which this Honorable Court can

reinstate, and any other action which aight affect
Respondent would be useless and futile, because
Respondent has been in jeopardy and was discharged
before judgment.
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If an advisory opinion is written, the lower
Court should be &ffirlled.

The lover Court gave

the prosecution every possible chance to justif1

its actions, and to show some reasonable basis for
the discriminatory treatment.

Because the prose-

cution produced nothing in justification, the lower
Court was compelled to arrest judgment.

The lower

Court did not err.
Respectfully subaitted,
ROBERT R. WALLACE
Attorney for Respondent

